

IC 75-1336
30 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: National Crisis SITREP

1. On 28 January 1975 (1030) C/PRD chaired a meeting with intelligence community representatives (constituting a USIB-formed ad hoc committee) to discuss testing the feasibility of producing a national situation report during crisis periods. Representatives from NSA, DIA, State/INR, CIA, and IC/PRD participated*. All agreed to the following:

-- that the test be conducted at CIA headquarters under the aegis of the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), which will appoint a test manager;

-- that agency production offices (NSA, DIA, and State/INR) and IC/PRD participate in the test and designate their own test managers as points of contact;

-- that a committee be formed, chaired by OCI's test manager and consisting of the various agency and IC/PRD points of contact (including [redacted] to work out test procedures;

-- that the real-world situation of Indo-China (North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand) be used as the test crisis;

-- that analysts remain in their home offices during the test; and

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-- that individual tests be spaced to allow for an adequate critique and "fine-tuning."

2. In principle, everyone agreed that the production of a national situation report during crises was a desirable objective. But all also had reservations concerning coordinating and issuing a national SITREP given time constraints imposed during a crisis. Mr. Lehman noted, and there was general agreement, that the two questions which must be answered by the test are: (1) Is a national SITREP technically feasible? and (2) If so, is it worth the effort? It was suggested that technical constraints (i.e., current, limited communications networks) might be the single most difficult problem hindering the community's ability to produce a national situation report. Both DIA and INR noted that a requirement to produce a national situation report might be in addition to, not in lieu of, the existing agency crisis products and thus add to rather than diminish the analysts' workload.

3. Aside from these arguments of practicality, DIA, in particular, expressed reservations about the impact which might result from the publication of a national crisis situation report upon its own roles and missions. C/PRD/IC and D/DCI/NIO noted that a national SITREP should have no impact on an agency's departmental or national responsibilities. On the contrary, one of the purposes of a community crisis situation report would be to reflect and explain differing agency points of view, not to submerge them in the unclear language of "coordinated" intelligence. [redacted] pointed out that DIA's participation in the publication of a national SITREP would not differ markedly from its role in other national intelligence products (SNIes, Alert Memorandum, etc.). While DIA did not make a direct response to these statements, DIA noted that should its misgivings persist through the test period, it will provide an explanation of its position for the final test report.




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